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NATURAL LAW AS PROFESSIONAL ETHICS: 
A READING OF FULLER* 
BY DAVID LUBAN 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Plato's Laws, the Athenian Stranger claims that the gods will smile 
only on a city where the law "is despot over the rulers and the rulers are 
slaves of the law." 1 This passage is the origin of the slogan "the rule of 
law not of men," an abbreviation of which forms our phrase "the rule of 
law." From Plato and Aristotle, through John Adams and John Marshall, 
down to us, no idea has proven more central to Western political and legal 
culture.2 Yet the slogan turns on a very dubious metaphor. Laws do not 
rule, and the "rule of law not of men" is actually a specific form of rule 
by men (including, nowadays, a few women). These rulers are not slaves 
to anything. Furthermore, the construction of the slogan -rule of law and 
not of men-has unfortunate connotations. It suggests that the personal 
qualities of the human rulers required to secure the rule of law are noth-
ing more than forbearance and disinterestedness-a resolution to stay out 
of law's way. 
What if the rule of law is more demanding than this? What if it turns 
out to be a particularly elaborate and technically ingenious form of the 
rule of (let me say) men and women? What if the rule of law establishes 
a moral relationship between those who govern and those whom they 
govern? Furthermore, what if sustaining this relationship requires certain 
moral attitudes and virtues on the part of the governors that are not 
simply disinterested forbearance, and not simply the moral attitudes and 
virtues required of everyone? 
• I have received helpful comments and criticisms from a number of readers, including the 
other contributors to this volume and participants in the Georgetown University Law Cen-
ter faculty workshop. In addition, I should like to thank Brian Bix, Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred 
Schauer, and Wibren van der Burg for extensive written comments on an earlier draft of this 
essay. 
1 Plato, The Laws of Plato, trans. Thomas L. Pangle (New York: Basic Books, 1980), 715d. 
2 Aristotle offers a similar phrase in the Politics, at 1287al-b1. Jonathan Barnes, ed., The 
Complete Works of Aristotle (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 2:2042. John 
Adams introduced the phrase "government of laws, and not of men" into America in his 
1774 "Novanglus Paper" (no. 7), reprinted in Charles Francis Adams, ed., The Works of John 
Adams (Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press, 1969), 4:106. From there it migrated into the 
Massachusetts constitution of 1780 and eventually into Justice Marshall's opinion in Mar-
bury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). Fred R. Shapiro, The Oxford Dictionary of American Legal 
Quotations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 319. 
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In that case, the rule of law would tum out to rely on the specifically pro-
fessional ethics of the lawmakers. One might be tempted to call this "po-
litical ethics," the ethics of rulers. But that is not quite right. Rulers are not 
identical with lawmakers. Rulers make decisions and devise policies, but 
decisions and policies are not yet laws. Embodying decisions and policies 
in the form of laws is a tricky business, technically difficult in exactly the 
same way that embodying private parties' intentions in a legal contract is 
difficult-and the people who carry out each of these lawmaking tasks are 
(what else?) lawyers. Thus, the rule of law relies on the professional ethics of 
lawyers (even if they do not call themselves lawyers or belong to the bar). 
Finally, what if the professional ethics of lawyer-lawmakers-the moral 
relationship and attitudes and virtues required by the rule of law-cohere 
better with laws enhancing human dignity than with laws assaulting it, 
because enacting laws that assault human dignity tends to undermine the 
moral relationship that sustains the rule of law? If this were the case, we 
would be entitled to assert that the rule of law morally constrains the 
content of laws. This sounds like a natural law theory. We could call it a 
theory of the "morality of law," provided we understood that the phrase 
refers to the morality of lawmakers, and only derivatively to the morality 
of laws. We would have a theory of natural law as professional ethics. 
What I have just described is the unfamiliar argument of a very familiar 
book, Lon Fuller's The Morality of Law (hereafter ML), first published in 
1964.3 (Note that in what follows, my page references to ML refer to the 
revised edition, published in 1969.) I call the argument unfamiliar because 
readers have typically treated ML as a book on general jurisprudence, not 
on professional ethics, and have neglected its moral theory to focus on 
what they regard as analytical claims about "the concept of law." But "the 
concept of law" is H. L. A. Hart's title, not Fuller's.4 
As Fuller himself observed in 1969 (ML 188), this misunderstanding is 
perfectly natural given the state of play in legal theory when he first 
published ML. For several years, he had been engaged in a debate with 
Hart, beginning with their famous exchange in the Harvard Law Review.5 
Hart weighed in next in The Concept of Law, which Fuller criticized in 
3 I will use the following abbreviations for works of Fuller to which I cite repeatedly: ML= 
The Morality of Law, rev. ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1969); LQI = The Law in 
Quest of Itself (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1940); PSO = The Principles of 
Social Order: Selected Essays of Lon L. Fuller, ed. Kenneth I. Winston (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 1981); PFL = "Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart," 
Harvard Law Review 71, no. 4 (February 1958): 630-72; RFCL = "Reason and Fiat in Case 
Law," Harvard Law Review 59, no. 3 (February 1946): 376-95; RN=" A Rejoinder to Professor 
Nagel," Natural Law Forum 3, no. 1 (1958): 83-104. 
The present essay examines, from a different perspective, themes I discuss in "Rediscov-
ering Fuller's Legal Ethics," published concurrently in Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 11, 
no. 4 (Swnmer 1998): 801-29; and Willem J. Witteveen and Wibren van der Burg, eds., 
Rediscovering Fuller: Essays on Implicit Law and Institutional Design (Amsterdam, The Neth-
erlands: University of Amsterdam Press, 1999), 193-225. 
4 H. L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961). 
5 H. L.A. Hart, "Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals," Harvard Law Review 
71, no. 4 (February 1958): 593-629. Fuller's reply is PFL, cited in full in note 3 above. 
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chapter 3 of ML. Hart returned the compliment when he reviewed ML,6 
and Fuller responded in the new appendix he wrote for the revised edi-
tion of ML. Subsequent readers have naturally assumed that Fuller and 
Hart were still debating the same issue of whether legal norms are logi-
cally distinct from moral norms-an issue framed by Hart in his own 
terms at the beginning of the debate. 
On this assumption, ML gets read approximately as follows. The cen-
tral argument of ML begins with the famous parable "Eight Ways to Fail 
to Make Law," found in chapter 2. The parable does two things. First, it 
provides an analysis of the rule of law into the eight familiar canons that 
Fuller calls "principles of legality." These hold that laws should exhibit (1) 
generality (i.e., legislating through rules rather than case-by-case direc-
tives), (2) publicity, (3) nonretroactivity, (4) clarity, (5) noncontradictori-
ness, (6) obeyability in practice, (7) constancy through time, and (8) 
congruence between the rules as announced and their actual administra-
tion (ML 39). Second, the parable argues that when these canons are 
violated, the result is not bad law, but no law at all. The canons, then, are 
necessary conditions on the concept of law. They are also, or so Fuller 
claims, an "inner morality of law"; because they have to do with the 
promulgation of laws, not with their content, this inner morality is a 
"procedural natural law." There is also a substantive natural law, but 
Fuller leaves the connection between the procedural and substantive 
branches of natural law obscure. And that's about it. 
How do those who read Fuller this way react to his argument? They 
generally like his analysis of the rule of law, which ranks alongside com-
parable efforts by John Rawls and Joseph Raz.7 Many accept the idea that 
without these canons there can be no law at all; however, most reject the 
claim that the canons represent principles of morality, inner or otherwise. 
It is this latter claim that forms the crux of the issue between Fuller and 
Hart, and the dominant view seems to be that Fuller was wrong. 
Undoubtedly, that latter claim is important. But reading Fuller in the 
manner described above slides over his treatment of substantive natural 
law, and treats the first chapter of ML, on ethical theory, as if it does not 
exist. As a result, the argument about professional ethics with which I 
began simply disappears from the reading entirely. And that is too bad, 
because in important ways (not every way) Fuller's argument is right. 
IL "THE WORD 'LAW' MEANS THE LIFE WORK OF THE LAWYER" 
Fuller never disguises his intentions. He says in ML that he will offer 
only one definition of law: "the enterprise of subjecting human conduct 
6 H. L.A. Hart, "Book Review-The Morality of I.aw," Harvard I.aw Review 78, no. 6 (April 
1965): 1281-96. 
7 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 235-
43; Joseph Raz, "The Rule of Law and Its Virtue," ww Quarterly Review 93, no. 2 (April 1977): 
195-211. 
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to the governance of rules" (ML 106). His title, The Morality of Law, then, 
must be paraphrased thus: "the morality of the enterprise of subjecting 
human conduct to the governance of rules." Fuller explicitly calls atten-
tion to the fact that his definition classifies law as an activity rather than, 
say, a set of propositions of law, or a distinctive kind of social norm. The 
activity of subjecting human conduct to rules, unlike the activity of gov-
' eming one's own conduct in accordance with rules, is performed specif-
ically by the rule-designer. "So when I speak of legal morality, I mean just 
that. I mean that special morality that attaches to the office of law-giver 
and law-applier." 8 He labels this a "role morality," and likens it to the 
distinctive ethics of lawyers-it is "no mere restatement of the moral 
principles governing human conduct generally, but ... special standards 
applicable to the discharge of a distinctive social function" (ML 193; see 
also PSO 201). In the second edition of ML, Fuller complains that "no 
modem positivist elevates to a central position in his thinking any limi-
tations contained in 'the law job' itself" (ML 192). The "law job" is per-
formed by the lawyer, whom he elsewhere calls the "architect of social 
structure" (PSO 50-52, 253, 264-70). This makes clear that ML is a book 
about professional ethics-specifically, the professional ethics of those 
lawyers Fuller refers to as lawgivers and law-appliers.9 
This way of thinking about law was already evident in 1940, when 
Fuller first discussed natural law and positivism in The Law in Quest of 
Itself After rehearsing the definitions of law offered by several philosoph-
ical schools, he considers the obvious concern that debates among them 
amount to little more than terminological hairsplitting. Here is how he 
responds: 
Yet if in these definitions the word "law" means the life work of the 
lawyer, it is apparent that something more vital than a verbal dispute 
hinges on the choice between them. Surely the man who conceives 
8 Lon L. Fuller, "A Reply to Professors Cohen and Dworkin," Villanova Law Review 10, 
no. 4 (Summer 1965): 660. He employs similar phrasing at ML 206. 
9 I do not mean that Fuller literally thought all legislators are professional lawyers. He 
understood, of course, that nonlawyer legislators decide on what should become law before 
turning it over to lawyers for drafting. He emphasized that the lawmaking job has a tech-
nical side, because embodying policies in effective rules is difficult in exactly the way that 
embodying parties' intentions in a well-wrought contract is difficult. Negotiating these 
difficulties is precisely the special craft of lawyers. Fuller also argued that the technical 
aspect of lawmaking imposes substantive constraints on what policies can be embodied in 
laws, because human activity "always involves a reciprocal adjustment between ends and 
means." Lon L. Fuller, "The Philosophy of Codes of Ethics," Electrical Engineering 74, no. 5 
(October 1955): 916. See Fuller's "Means and Ends," in PSO, 52-58. Not every conceivable 
end can be turned into workable law. In this sense, all legislation requires the exercise of 
lawyerly skills, even when the legislator is not a lawyer. The reciprocal adjustment of ends 
and means likewise implies that a transactional lawyer papering a deal shapes it rather than 
serving as a mere scrivener: lawyering requires the exercise of legislative skills, even when 
the lawyer is not a legislator. It follows that the roles of legislators and lawyers are closer 
than appears at first sight, and this overlap matters to Fuller-it is one of the points of his 
King Rex parable. Hence my talk of lawyers in the text. 
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his task as that of reducing the relations of men to a reasoned har-
mony will be a different kind of lawyer from one who regards his 
task as that of charting the behavior of certain elderly state officials. 
(LQI 3-4) 
"The word 'law' means the life work of the lawyer." This is not just a rhetorical 
hook to capture the interest of the law school audience to which he was 
lecturing. It is, in paraphrase, the very definition he employs in ML. 
In the second sentence of the quotation from LQI, Fuller offers his own 
characterization of natural law, or rather, of the activity of the natural law 
lawyer: "reducing the relations of men to a reasoned harmony." On its 
face, this is strikingly different from the most common understanding of 
natural law in analytic jurisprudence. Analytic philosophers of law tend 
to regard natural law and positivism as competing theses about the re-
lation between legal and moral propositions. Jules Coleman's careful def-
inition is a good example: on his account, positivism is the "proposition 
that there exists at least one conceivable legal system in which the rule of 
recognition does not specify being a principle of morality among the truth 
conditions for any proposition of law." 10 Natural law, then, is the view 
that in every conceivable legal system, the rule of recognition (the rule by 
which we recognize valid laws) specifies that being a principle of moral-
ity is among the truth conditions for any proposition of law. 
Fuller characterizes natural law as a way of conducting a practical 
activity-"reducing the relations of men to a reasoned harmony" -
rather than as a philosophical thesis about the truth conditions of prop-
ositions of law. For Fuller, there is not really a thesis associated with 
natural law at all (RN 84). Of course, Fuller believes that there is a 
characteristic morality associated with the "law job" (ML 192). But this 
marks an important shift in emphasis. Where other writers on all sides 
of the positivism/natural law debate understand the phrase "the mo-
rality of law" to refer to the morality of laws, for Fuller it refers to the 
morality of lawmaking. 
This usage, which is quite consistent in Fuller's work, is bound to 
create confusions for those who assume that the phrase "the morality of 
law" refers not to the moral code of the rule-designer but rather to the 
moral content of legal rules. In particular, it means that when positivists 
deny that the law has any necessary moral content, Fuller tends to hear 
them asserting that no moral code governs lawgiving, a claim that he 
finds preposterous. Positivists, however, do not really intend to make this 
claim. Similarly, when Fuller insists that there is a morality to law, his 
critics assume that he is making a conceptual claim about the necessary 
10 Jules L. Coleman, "Negative and Positive Positivism," in Marshall Cohen, ed., Ronald 
Dworkin and Contemporary Jurisprudence (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allenheld, 1983), 31. This 
is Coleman's definition of "negative" (that is, minimal) positivism. 
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connection between legal rules and morality, rather than arguing that 
lawmaking is a profession with a distinctive professional ethics. But it is 
the latter that Fuller means. 
I said earlier that Fuller classifies lawgivers and law-appliers (legisla-
tors and judges) together with lawyers.11 This will seem puzzling until we 
realize that Fuller invariably has in mind transactional lawyers, not liti-
gators (who, he observes, are a small minority of the legal profession 
[PSO 252-53]). As noted above, Fuller views the lawyer as an "architect 
of social structure"; he regards litigation, the recourse when social struc-
ture fails, as a poor-even perverse-focus for understanding what makes 
lawyers' work important. It would be like trying to understand an edu-
cator's work by focusing on the process of disciplining classroom trouble-
makers, or trying to understand marriage by examining divorce.12 
Three characteristics of the transactional lawyer make him the para-
digm jurist in Fuller's eyes. First, his job is to facilitate interaction be-
tween two or more private parties-and facilitating interaction is, for 
Fuller, the principal aim of law. Second, although the transactional lawyer 
advises his client, sometimes quite forcefully-he is not merely a mouth-
piece or a scrivener-he understands that the client, not the lawyer, is the 
person who has to do the interacting after the deal is made. This is the 
fundamental moral fact about the relationship. Third, the transactional 
lawyer facilitates the interaction by drawing up a framework of rules-a 
contract, the transactional equivalent of a piece of legislation.13 
ill. ExcELLENCES AS PowERs: "SIN Is 
A SINKING INTO NOTHINGNESS" 
When we fully appreciate that The Morality of Law is a book about 
professional ethics rather than a traditional treatise on jurisprudence, we 
can better understand why Fuller begins the book with a chapter on 
ethical theory, and why the chapter opens with contrasting definitions of 
'sin', rather than, say, justice or injustice. Talk about sin would be strange 
11 On this point, see also Kenneth I. Winston, "Legislators and Liberty," Law and Philosophy 
13, no. 3 (August 1994): 393-96. 
12 These analogies are mine, not Fuller's. Although transactional lawyers must anticipate 
possible litigation, "battening down the hatches against possible future litigation" (PSO 253) 
cannot be their principal job as they draft contracts. The clients are trying to get something 
done, not merely avoid losses when their projects shipwreck. Fuller more than once quotes 
Aquinas's dictum that if the highest duty of a captain were to preserve his ship, he would 
keep it in port forever. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 2, a. 5, quoted at PSO 56, ML 185. 
I discuss Fuller's conception of lawyers' work more fully in "Rediscovering Fuller's Legal 
Ethics," 810-19. 
13 Fuller argues, strikingly, that the terms contained in a contract are just as much law as 
the rules governing the formation of contracts. PSO 174-75. He is a legal pluralist-someone 
who believes that there are many legal systems in a society, not just the big legal system 
administered by the state: on this account, both private actors and the state can make law. 
Fuller argues explicitly for legal pluralism at ML 123-29. 
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if the subject were the morality of laws, rather than the morality of law-
making. Because Fuller is focusing on the latter, however, he is interested 
in the ways lawyers can sin against the enterprise in which they are 
engaged. To an unusual extent, Fuller personalizes jurisprudence: he sees 
acts of legislation and interpretation as products of lawgivers and law-
appliers, products whose quality depends crucially on the people who 
make them. 
Fuller's moral theory turns on a distinction between the morality of 
duty-"the most obvious demands of social living" (ML 9)-and the 
morality of aspiration-"the morality of the Good Life, of excellence, of 
the fullest realization of human powers" (ML 5). Several points stand 
out. 
1. There is, first of all, the idea that aspiration has a morality. This is 
hardly an obvious point. Many of our aspirations fall under the general 
heading of things that it would be nice to do, but there is nothing espe-
cially moral about the category of the 'that-would-be-nice'. It would be 
nice if I could play the piano, speak German, and work the exercises in 
the old mathematics textbooks that have been hibernating on my shelf 
since college. All these things being among my interests, it is natural to 
think of them as aspirations. But it would be odd for anyone to take me 
to task for my failings at piano, German, and mathematics, and equally 
odd for me to feel ashamed about them. In contrast, speaking of moral 
failings implies, at the minimum, a dimension of blame and shame: moral 
failings are among those failings that do deserve criticism (from both 
oneself and others). Otherwise, why call them moral failings? From a 
moral outlook centered on rights and duties, "mere" aspiration is a non-
moral phenomenon; Fuller's claim to the contrary marks out a distinctive 
moral position. 
2. Kant believed that we lie under a duty to improve ourselves; this and 
the duty to promote others' happiness are the principal obligations he 
elaborates in the "Doctrine of Virtue." 14 These two duties roughly corre-
spond with Fuller's categories, but Fuller rejects the reduction of aspira-
tion to duty (ML 5). Instead, he finds that criticism appropriate to the 
morality of aspiration involves terms like "failure" and "shortcoming, not 
... wrongdoing," as well as assertions that one has not engaged in "con-
duct such as beseems a human being functioning at his best" (ML 5; see 
also ML 3). In other words, the morality of aspiration employs the vo-
cabulary of human excellence-what philosophers call' aretaic' concepts-
rather than 'deontic' concepts, the vocabulary of right or wrong action. In 
that sense, the morality of aspirations lies very close to contemporary 
14 See generally Immanuel Kant, "The Doctrine of Virtue," in Kant, The Metaphysics of 
Morals, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). The treatise is 
divided into two principal sections: "On Duties to Oneself as Such" and "Duties of Virtue 
to Others." See also Marcia Baron, "Kantian Ethics," in Marcia Baron, Philip Pettit, and 
Michael Slote, Three Methods of Ethics: A Debate (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1997), 13-21. 
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virtue ethics, the view that places aretaic concepts at the heart of moral 
theory.15 
3. When is it appropriate to treat aspirations morally, rather than 
merely as things it would be nice to do? Fuller never explicitly ad-
dresses this question, but the use to which he puts the distinction 
suggests one important answer: our aspirations have a moral dimension 
whenever other people's well-being depends on them. Paradigmatically, this 
will be true in the sphere of work, and specifically in the professions. It 
is hardly coincidental that aretaic concepts evolved in Greek thought to 
characterize warriors, whose excellences and failures meant the differ-
ence between prosperity and disaster for those who relied on them.16 
In more peaceable societies, we continue to think "aretaically" when 
we choose a surgeon or a lawyer. We want something more than du-
tifulness, which after all is merely the requirement for avoiding mal-
practice liability. We want someone who strives for professional excellence 
and attains it. We criticize professionals who fail for want of excellence, 
along with those who do not even strive for it. This is moral criticism, 
and it is based in the morality of aspiration. 
Even when no one else's well-being depends directly on our work (as 
is true, for example, in the writing of philosophy), the morality of aspi-
ration applies in a derivative way. It would (merely) be nice if I could play 
the piano; playing the piano is, for me, a nonmoral aspiration. But, as a 
writer on philosophical topics, it is a more serious failing that my German 
is not good enough to read Kant or Hegel. If my philosophizing is slip-
shod, that is an even more serious failing. Here, the morality of aspiration 
applies. 
In general, it seems, aspiration "goes moral" when our aspirations tie 
in to serious commitments, when they move from the amateur to the 
professional. Fuller is in love with the idea of professionalism. He cel-
ebrates the virtues of excellence in work; in this respect, his nearest lit-
erary counterpart is Primo Levi in The Monkey's Wrench and The Periodic 
Table.17 Thus, the third point that emerges from Fuller's "two moralities" 
15 For an alternative approach to Fuller's theory, see Wibren van der Burg, "The Morality 
of Aspiration: A Neglected Dimension of Law and Morality," in Witteveen and van der Burg, 
eds., Rediscovering Fuller, 174-80. Van der Burg focuses on Fuller's claim that the moralities 
of duty and aspiration lie on a single continuum (ML 9-10), but I believe that this was a 
mistake on Fuller's part. The continuum image implies that there will be some point above 
which everything is aspiration and below which everything is duty. However, ideals such 
as always doing my duty, never being negligent or unfair for even a single second, or 
leading a perfectly blameless life belong simultaneously to the morality of duty and the 
morality of aspiration: to deviate from these ideals violates the morality of aspiration, but 
by definition each deviation also violates a duty. Hence, the continuum metaphor must 
be incorrect. For this reason, I emphasize the categorical differences between aspiration 
and duty. 
16 A. W. H. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility: A Study in Greek Values (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1960), 30-60. 
17 Primo Levi, The Monkey's Wrench, trans. William Weaver (New York: Penguin, 1987); 
Primo Levi, The Periodic Table, trans. Raymond Rosenthal (New York: Schocken, 1984). 
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discussion -alongside the ideas that aspiration has a morality, and that its 
morality is a kind of virtue ethics-is the thought that professional ethics 
includes the morality of aspiration as one of its central features. 
4. Next, consider the quotation with which Fuller begins the first chap-
ter of ML: "Sin is a sinking into nothingness" (ML 3).18 The absence of 
excellence, of virtue, is not badness so much as nonbeing. This is a fa-
miliar Platonic and Augustinian idea, and I think it is quite false as a 
general account of evil. It makes a great deal of sense, however, when 
applied to aretaic concepts such as "virtue" (a word that for Fuller has the 
"original sense of power, efficacy, skill, and courage" [ML 15]). If a lawyer 
is not doing any of the things a good lawyer does, she is not merely 
practicing law badly. She is not practicing law at all. Virtues are functional 
excellences, and a professional role is defined by its functions; take away 
enough of the professional virtues, and the result is simply not recogniz-
able as the professional role. 
It should be clear why these four major points are important to under-
standing Fuller's jurisprudential argument. I have been claiming that 
Fuller's morality of law is a set of excellences that belong to the profes-
sional ethics-the role-morality-of lawmakers. This is specifically true of 
the inner morality of law: Fuller's eight canons of lawmaking. It is sig-
nificant, after all, that Fuller introduces the canons with the parable of 
King Rex, who aimed "to make his name in history as a great lawgiver" 
(ML 34)-an entirely aretaic ambition. As Fuller tells the story, moreover, 
Rex's failures led him repeatedly to reflect not on the concept of law, but 
on his own personal failings-further evidence that Fuller's focus is on 
the legislator, not the legislation.19 If sin is a sinking into nothingness, 
then we can understand Fuller's famous conclusion that Rex "never even 
succeeded in creating any law at all, good or bad" (ML 34) in a somewhat 
nonstandard light. It becomes an observation about the role-morality of 
law-giving rather than an analytical claim about necessary conditions on 
the very concept of law. Fuller is simply pointing out that whatever King 
Rex did when he issued directives in a fashion that entirely lacked the 
characteristic excellences of the lawgiver's craft, he was not subjecting 
human conduct to the governance of rules. He was not making law. 
These observations derive from a more general point about what I will 
call purposive concepts-concepts that define objects by the functions they 
serve in fulfilling purposes. For example, 'light switch' is a purposive con-
18 
"Der Sunde ist ein Versinken in das Nichts." Significantly, Fuller says he may have 
imagined this quotation, an admission that suggests how central it is to his outlook. 
19 Consider, for example, these statements found in the parable: "His first move was to 
subscribe to a course of lessons in generalization" (ML 34); "Rex undertook an earnest 
inventory of his personal strengths and weaknesses" (ML 35); "Continuing his lessons in 
generalization, Rex worked diligently. ... " (ML 35); "Recognizing for the first time that he 
needed assistance .... " (ML 36); "By now, however, Rex had lost his patience with his 
subjects" (ML 36); "Reflecting on the misadventures of his reign, he concluded ... " (ML 37). 
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cept: it defines objects by their function of turning lights on and off.2° Full-
er's fundamental insight into purposive concepts is that to identify an object 
purposively is implicitly to specify a standard of success and failure. Fuller 
puts this strikingly when he writes that the concept of a steam engine" over-
laps mightily" with the concept of a good steam engine ( LQI 10-11). 'Steam 
engine' is a purposive concept: what makes devices steam engines is their 
ability to convert steam power to usable mechanical energy. What a steam 
engine is good for and what a steam engine is "overlap mightily." 
This point carries the important consequence that when we use purpo-
sive concepts in descriptions, we are automatically evaluating as well as 
describing. Take a simple example. Touring a house, I notice an odd-looking 
bump on the wall. It can be wiggled from side to side, but wiggling it does 
nothing whatsoever. I'm puzzled. Suddenly I recognize that the bump is 
a broken light switch. This is one single recognition, not two: to identify 
the bump as a light switch is simultaneously to identify it as a defective 
light switch. If I have no idea that a light switch that does not tum the lights 
on or off is defective, I lack the concept 'light switch' altogether.21 
The way that Fuller usually phrases this point is to say that the is and 
the ought cannot be sharply distinguished, or that they merge. This is a mad-
deningly elusive way of putting things, and even Fuller recognized that 
"phrases like 'a merger of fact and value' are unsatisfactory" (RN 83). The 
reason such phrases are unsatisfactory is that they wrongly suggest that to 
describe something as a steam engine is already to describe it as a good 
steam engine. This is certainly not what Fuller means to say. Substitute the 
word 'law' for' steam engine' and this sort of misinterpretation is disastrous. 
As I interpret them, such phrases instead assert that to recognize some-
thing as a steam engine or a light switch is already to recognize what it ought 
to do, to recognize a built-in standard of success or failure. Success or fail-
ure at what? At being a steam engine or a light switch-at being what it is, 
one might say. Purposive concepts are aspirational concepts-and now we 
recognize that Fuller's morality of aspiration is intimately connected with 
his analysis of purposive concepts, and hence with the is I ought distinction. 
This point can be turned around. If an object is so bad at converting 
steam power to mechanical energy or turning lights on and off that we 
cannot even recognize it as unsuccessfully doing these things, then we will 
be unable to recognize the object as a steam engine or light switch at all. 
The worse things get at fulfilling the purposes of steam engines and light 
switches, the closer they get to the threshold between being a bad steam 
20 Defining objects purposively is a special case of functional definition; it is not the only 
case, of course, because there are also functional concepts defining objects by the roles they 
play in nonpurposive processes. For chemists, 'catalyst' is a functional concept, but it is not 
purposive, because chemical reactions are not purposes. 
21 Fuller argues that omitting the purpose in descriptions of purposive objects makes 
them misdescriptions. Lon L. Fuller, "Human Purpose and Natural Law," Natural Law 
Forum 3, no. 1 (1958): 68-70. 
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engine or light switch and not being a steam engine or light switch at all. 
Sin is a sinking into nothingness. 
One more point about the evaluative dimension of purposive concepts 
turns out to be crucial to Fuller's understanding of the morality of law. There 
is nothing distinctively moral about converting steam power to usable me-
chanical energy or turning lights on and off-so the "merger of is and ought" 
in these examples is not quite a merger of fact and value. Matters are dif-
ferent, however, when the purposively defined entity is a person defined 
throughhersocialoroccupationalrole ('parent', 'physician', 'lawyer', 'law-
maker'), and the means by which she fulfills the role's purposes create a 
long-term moral relationship with other people. In such cases, the standard 
of success implicit in the purposive concept is not just fulfillment of the 
occupation's ends narrowly conceived. Instead, the standard of success is 
fulfillment of these ends in a manner consistent with the moral relation-
ship, for if the role-occupier chronically betrays the moral relationship, the 
other parties will dissolve it. Under this standard, a relationship that orig-
inates only as a means to an end becomes incorporated into the end itself. 
IV. "THE CITIZEN'S ROLE AS A SELF-DETERMINING AGENT" 
According to Fuller, when a lawmaker systematically violates any of 
the canons of the internal morality of law-the role-morality of his or her 
job-the result is not law (ML 39). What, then, if not law, is it? Fuller 
seems to think that there are two characteristic answers to this question. 
His first answer emerges when he discusses the Nazi legal system or 
other criminal legal systems. In this discussion, he leaves little doubt that 
he considers these systems as nothing more than Hart's illegitimate "gun-
man writ large" -examples of raw power disguised as law. 
However, violating the eight canons need not be illegitimate in the way 
that the gunman writ large is illegitimate. Fuller's second answer is that 
law must be distinguished from "managerial direction" (ML 207)-a form 
of governance that is perfectly legitimate in many everyday contexts, but 
that involves no commitment to the canons of generality or congruence 
between official action and declared rule.22 Managerial direction is a form 
of governance, but it is not the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to 
the governance of rules, because managerial directives are not necessarily 
rules: a manager can deviate from his own general directives whenever 
circumstances require. 
22 Fuller mistakenly asserts that the issue of nonretroactivity never arises in managerial 
direction, because no manager would ever order someone today to do something yesterday 
(ML 209). However, a manager might find it quite expedient to change a policy retroactively. 
For example, a manager might decide to deduct the costs of tools that workers damage from 
their pay, and it is easy to imagine circumstances in which the manager might wish to make 
this policy retroactive. If the terms of employment do not protect workers from policies like 
this, and if there is no labor union to fight the policy, we can readily imagine that the 
manager will be successful. Thus, Fuller's point should have been that in a managerial 
context, there is no necessary moral commitment to nonretroactivity. 
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Usually, when Fuller asserts that governance that systematically vio-
lates the eight canons is not law, the way to understand the phrase "not 
law" is as an abbreviation for "not law but tyranny" or "not law but 
managerial direction." 23 (The distinction between tyranny and manage-
rial direction is that in the latter, but not the former, subordinates share 
their superiors' aims.) For Fuller, the "identification of law with every 
conceivable kind of official act" (ML 169) is a conceptual mistake that 
leads to misunderstandings about the morality of law.24 
In particular, Fuller argues that governing the conduct of others through 
law rather than managerial direction is itself a morally freighted choice. 
According to Fuller, it implies "a certain built-in respect for [the] human 
dignity" of those subject to the law ("the governed," as I shall call them 
for short), in a way that managerial direction does not.25 This is the case 
for several reasons. 
First, it recognizes that the form of governance will not be by moment-
by-moment direct supervision. Governance through general rules, unlike 
managerial direction, presumes a measure of respect for the moral powers 
of the governed. "To embark on the enterprise of subjecting human con-
duct to the governance of rules involves of necessity a commitment to the 
view that man is, or can become, a responsible agent, capable of under-
standing and following rules, and answerable for his defaults" (ML 162). 
Elsewhere, Fuller makes the Wittgensteinian point that legal rules cannot 
explicitly exclude all aberrant interpretations in advance, and concludes 
that relying on the governed to follow rules presupposes shared "notions 
of the limits of legal decency and sanity." 26 Governance through rules im-
plies that the governed and the governors belong to the same interpretive 
community and have roughly equivalent powers of intellect and will. 
Second, governance through general rules, unlike specific directives, 
presupposes the autonomy of the governed. "The law does not tell a man 
what he should do to accomplish specific ends set by the lawgiver; it 
furnishes him with baselines against which to organize his life with his 
fellows .... Law provides a framework for the citizen within which to live 
his own life" (PSO 234).27 Elsewhere, Fuller describes "the view of man 
implicit in legal morality" (ML 162) as "the citizen's role as a self-
23 The one notable exception is the King Rex parable itself. There, the hapless king is 
neither a manager nor a tyrant-he is merely an incompetent. 
24 Here (and in other places) my reading is influenced by Jeremy Waldron, "Why Law-
Efficacy, Freedom, or Fidelity?" Law and Philosophy 13, no. 3 (August 1994): 259-84. 
25 Fuller, "A Reply to Professors Cohen and Dworkin," 665. 
26 Lon L. Fuller, Anatomy of the Law (New York: Praeger, 1968), 63. 
27 Fuller makes the same point in ML: "[L]aw furnishes a baseline for self-directed action, 
not a detailed set of instructions for accomplishing specific objectives." ML 210. He also uses 
the "baseline" terminology to make the converse point, namely, that not only does law 
presuppose the goal-setting freedom of the governed, but that the goal-setting freedom of 
the governed requires law. "To live the good life ... requires the support of firm base lines 
for human interaction, something that-in modem society at least-only a sound legal 
system can supply." ML 205. He elaborates this latter point in "Freedom-A Suggested 
Analysis," Harvard Law Review 68, no. 8 (June 1955): 1305-25. 
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determining agent" (ML 166). To be a lawgiver rather than a command-
giver is to treat the citizen as a self-determining agent. 
Governing through general rules also implies a certain impersonality in 
the relationship between governors and governed. Each individual falls 
under a rule only as a member of a general class, and each action is 
likewise judged only on the basis of general characteristics. What matters 
is what we are and do, not who we are-our deeper identity remains 
outside law's purview. Government through general rules contrasts starkly 
with the patrimonial familiarity that breeds contempt; law treats us as 
'Sie' rather than 'du', as 'vous' rather than 'tu'. 
Third, governance through rules, unlike the gunman writ large, assumes 
a measure of self-enforcement and self-monitoring on the part of the gov-
erned. Governance through rules, which is relatively cumbersome, would 
be unnecessary if an enforcer were always present. Although a tyrant can 
dominate a hostile population using a surprisingly small number of 
police-by making it extremely dangerous to even attempt to organize re-
sistance that could overwhelm the police force-governance through rules 
presumes at least the passive cooperation of the governed (ML 216).28 
Respect for the governed, respect for the autonomy of the governed, 
and trust in the governed-these are the three overlapping moral values 
underlying a governor's choice of law, rather than managerial direction, 
as the specific form of governance. Fuller's point, then, seems to be that 
embarking on the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the gover-
nance of rules creates a certain kind of moral relationship between gov-
ernor and governed. It is, specifically, a relationship in which a governor 
abjures the streamlined efficiency of managerial direction in favor of trust-
ing the governed to understand and follow general rules on their own. 
Once we see this point, a puzzling passage from The Morality of Law 
begins to make sense. Many of Fuller's critics complain that Fuller's eight 
principles of legality are merely conditions of efficacy, not moral princi-
ples. They accept that Fuller's King Rex parable demonstrates that gov-
ernors must follow the eight canons if they want people to obey their 
laws. These critics argue, however, that this is true whether the laws in 
question are good or evil, and thus that the canons themselves have 
nothing to do with morality. To illustrate the point, Hart observes that 
there are also rules of effective poisoning. Dworkin makes the same point 
with blackmail and genocide; Marshall Cohen, with murder; and Schauer, 
more recently, with lynching.29 
28 For an illuminating explanation of how even widely hated police states can maintain 
their dominance using a surprisingly small number of enforcers, see Russell Hardin, One for 
All: The Logic of Group Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 29-32. 
29 Hart, "Book Review-The Morality of Law," 1286; Ronald Dworkin, "Philosophy, Mo-
rality, and Law-Observations Prompted by Professor Fuller's Novel Claim," University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 113, no. 5 (March 1965): 676; Ronald Dworkin, "The Elusive Mo-
rality of Law," Villanova Law Review 10, no. 4 (Summer 1965): 634; Marshall Cohen, "Law, 
Morality, and Purpose," Villanova Law Review 10, no. 4 (Summer 1965): 651; Frederick Schauer, 
"Fuller's Internal Point of View," Law and Philosophy 13, no. 3 (August 1994): 302-4. 
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Fuller responds strangely: "I must confess that this line of argument 
struck me at first as being so bizarre, and even perverse, as not to deserve 
an answer" (ML 201). But what is so bizarre and perverse about it? Fuller 
himself insists that his eight canons are principles of efficacy (ML 155-56); 
indeed, when he introduced the idea of an internal morality of law in his 
1958 reply to Hart, he argued for its canons solely on grounds of efficacy 
(PFL 644-45). 
What strikes Fuller as perverse about the accusation that he has con-
fused morality with efficacy is that he regards the choice to govern through 
law rather than managerial direction as a sacrifice of efficacy for moral 
ends (ML 202-3). To put the point another way: while Fuller agrees that 
the principles of legality are instrumentally necessary to make gover-
nance by law effective (ML 155-56), he thinks that governing by law 
rather than managerial direction represents a sacrifice of expediency in 
the name of principle. The ultimate justification of the principles of le-
gality is therefore moral, not instrumental. Fuller finds the poisoning and 
blackmail analogies perverse because they assume that an evildoer would 
for some mysterious reason choose as an instrument of evil a relatively 
ineffective tool-a tool, moreover, that is relatively ineffective because it 
displays precisely the kind of moral regard for its victim that an evildoer 
lacks.30 
Consider, by analogy, a professor's decision to teach a large class 
through the Socratic method of eliciting the classroom material by ques-
tioning students rather than by straight lecture. (The analogy is mine, 
not Fuller's.) The Socratic method is much less efficient than lecturing, 
and much harder to do well. It sacrifices coverage of material, it fre-
quently frustrates and puzzles students, and it makes classroom progress 
hostage to the commitment and capabilities of the class. Why, then, 
would a teacher choose the Socratic method? The principal reason is 
that teachers wish to train their students in the art of analyzing issues 
for themselves, along with the art of explaining their own thinking, in 
public, on their feet. The point of Socratic teaching is to cultivate the 
students' active powers, even at the cost of efficiency. This is very 
similar to what Fuller takes to be the point of governance through law: 
to cultivate activity rather than passivity, to enhance rather than restrict 
the citizens' powers of self-determination, even though self-determination 
is unruly and therefore inefficient. 
30 As I read Fuller's argument, it is precisely the argument offered by John Finnis in his 
exposition of Fuller: "Adherence to the Rule of Law (especially the eighth requirement, of 
conformity by officials to pre-announced and stable general rules) is always liable to reduce 
the efficiency for evil of an evil government, since it systematically restricts the govern-
ment's freedom of maneuver." Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1980), 274. Thus, "[a] tyranny devoted to pernicious ends has no self-sufficient reason 
to submit itself to the discipline of operating consistently through the demanding pro-
cesses of law, granted that the rational point of such self-discipline is the very value of 
reciprocity, fairness, and respect for persons which the tyrant, ex hypothesi, holds in con-
tempt." Ibid., 273. 
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Socratic teaching is also subject to characteristic abuses that are quite 
analogous to the abuse of law by tyrants. When a teacher really has a 
lecture idea in mind, but tries to elicit it through Socratic questioning, she 
will find herself compelled to deal brusquely with student answers that 
do not take the discussion where she wants it to go. She will cut comers 
to guide the discussion, and students will quickly perceive that they are 
involved in a Socratic shell game of guessing what the teacher has in 
mind, not in cultivating their own powers. They will rightly view this as 
a betrayal of the teacher-student relationship: the teacher here is merely 
pretending to respect the students' intellectual autonomy and cultivate 
their powers; in reality, she is dominating them.31 
Does Fuller mean to deny, then, that a lawmaker may have domination 
on his mind? Not at all.32 His conclusion is substantially more interesting 
than that. Fuller argues that every exercise of social power requires some 
reciprocity. Even a blackmailer has to exercise some restraint; otherwise, 
his victim might elect to reveal his own shameful secret in order to bring 
the bite to an end. Here, Fuller observes, we can imagine the blackmailer 
pleading with the victim not to do this, and promising to be less greedy 
in the future (PSO 195-96). Elsewhere, Fuller suggests that a tyrant will 
find that domination will be easier if he enlists his subjects' cooperation 
by enhancing their freedom and happiness.33 If a lawmaker persistently 
abuses his relationship with the governed, he will be unable to count on 
the governed to interpret and follow rules; therefore, a decision to govern 
through rules rather than orders, perhaps undertaken initially because 
the order-giver cannot be everywhere at once, imposes moral constraints 
on the order-giver. The more that the power-holder turns tasks over to the 
subordinate for his own convenience, the more he makes himself depen-
dent on the agency and independence of the subordinate. In that case, 
reciprocity tends toward at least rough equality, and one-way projection 
of authority becomes two-way interaction.34 
31 A famous philosophy professor (no names, please) was a legendary practitioner of the 
Socratic shell game, and generations of students parodied his teaching with the following 
dialogue. Professor: I'm thinking of a number between 1 and 500. Mr. A, please tell me the 
number. Student A: 15? Professor: No. Ms. B? Student B: Um, is it 96? Professor (fiercely): Ms. 
B, I asked you to name the number between 1 and 500 I am thinking of. Do you really think 
you've answered my question? Mr. C, tell us the number. Student C: 216. Professor: That is 
correct. Ms. B, now do you see your mistake? 
The professor was widely regarded as an unforgivable intellectual bully. 
32 
"I have never asserted that there is any logical contradiction in the notion of achieving 
evil, at least some kinds of evil, through means that fully respect all the demands of 
legality." Fuller, "A Reply to Professors Cohen and Dworkin," 664. 
33 See Lon Fuller, "Freedom as a Problem of Allocating Choice," Proceedings of the Amer-
ican Philosophical Society 112, no. 2 (April 1968): 105-6. 
34 Although this is not the place to discuss this point in any detail, Fuller has offered a 
version of Hegel's master I slave argument from the Phenomenology of Spirit. There, Hegel 
describes the evolution of relationships of pure dependency (of the slave on the master, who 
holds the power of life and death over him) to relationships of reverse dependency (as the 
master comes to rely on the slave, who takes over the active role, playing Jeeves to the 
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Fuller describes his theory as an interactional view of law (ML 221), 
because in his view the choice of law over managerial direction implies a 
moral relationship between governors and the governed based on mutu-
ality (ML 209, 216). 
Government says to the citizen in effect, "These are the rules we 
expect you to follow. If you follow them, you have our assurance that 
they are the rules that will be applied to your conduct." When this 
bond of reciprocity is finally and completely ruptured by govern-
ment, nothing is left on which to ground the citizen's duty to observe 
the rules. (ML 39-40) 
This is an entirely different moral relationship than that of managerial 
direction-"the basic relation of order-giver and order-executor" (ML 
209)-although even managerial direction creates some reciprocity. Inter-
estingly, Fuller insists that within the managerial context, the canons of 
clarity, noncontradictoriness, obeyability, constancy through time, and 
publicity really are principles of efficacy and nothing more (ML 208-9); 
the clear implication of this point is that he believes that these canons 
have a different status in the context of law. There, they are professional 
virtues of the lawgiver, part and parcel of the mutual respect that Fuller 
believes is at the heart of the relationship between a lawmaker and those 
whom she governs. 
In what sense are canons like clarity, noncontradictoriness, or con-
stancy through time professional virtues of the lawgiver? Consider a 
group of people who wish to go into business together, and who retain a 
lawyer to draw up a partnership agreement that reconciles the diver-
gences that inevitably exist among their interests. The partners are en-
trusting their joint venture to the lawyer; they are counting on the lawyer's 
professional ability to craft an agreement that will provide a workable 
architecture for their enterprise. If the partnership agreement turns out to 
be unclear, self-contradictory, or incapable of execution, this is betrayal, 
not just incoherence or "inefficacy." 35 The partners will suffer for the 
master's increasingly infantile and incompetent Bertie Wooster) and, later, to relationships 
of reciprocity. G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1977), 111-19. 
35 Indeed, all of these infirmities are breach-of-contract defenses at common law: they 
void at least the afflicted clauses of the instrument. When we notice this, and recall that 
Fuller was a contracts scholar, it is tempting to argue that Fuller derived the canons by 
asking himself what conditions are necessary for a valid social contract between governors 
and the governed. Recall in this connection the passage quoted above, in which government 
"makes an offer" to citizens: "These are the rules we expect you to follow. If you follow 
them, you have our assurance that they are the rules that will be applied to your conduct." 
This sounds a great deal like a social contract. It is noteworthy as well that when Fuller 
discusses total failure to abide by the canons, he writes, "[i]t results in something that is not 
properly called a legal system at all, except perhaps in the Pickwickian sense in which a void 
contract can still be said to be one kind of contract." ML 39, emphasis added. 
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lawyer's fecklessness. Those who claim that Fuller's canons merely rep-
resent conditions of efficacy appear to overlook this point when they 
emphasize that a ruler who violates the canons will be unable to accom-
plish his aim, as though the point of the ruler's activity is only to accom-
plish his own aim, rather than the aims of those he rules. It is this, 
perhaps, that leads Fuller repeatedly to accuse his critics of viewing gov-
ernment "as a one-way projection of authority" (ML 204). 
We can be more specific about how the eight canons are virtues of 
lawmaking. The two most fundamental-the canons that distinguish the 
law-giving enterprise from managerial control -are the canons of gener-
ality and congruence between rules and their enforcement. The former 
insists that governors give directions in the form of general rules; the 
latter demands that they treat those rules as binding on themselves as 
well as on the governed, in the sense that they will not depart from the 
rules they have announced.36 The commitment to bind the governed only 
through general rules that also bind the lawmaker establishes the moral 
relationship of reciprocity between governors and the governed. These 
two canons are moral commitments that define the enterprise as law-
giving rather than something else. 
The remaining six canons fall into two natural groupings: precepts of 
clear communication and precepts of reasonable expectation. Once the law-
maker has undertaken to govern through general rules binding on both 
her and the governed, she must announce the rules to the governed, and 
she must ensure that her rules are ones that the governed may reasonably 
be expected to follow. Rather obviously, the canons of clarity and pub-
licity are aspects of clear communication, while the canons of constancy 
and obeyability are aspects of reasonable expectation. The remaining 
canons-nonretroactivity and noncontradictoriness-may be regarded as 
aspects of both clear communication and reasonable expectation. A rule 
requiring me to do something today is not adequately communicated if it 
is not issued until tomorrow, nor is it reasonable to expect me to abide by 
it; likewise, a self-contradictory rule conveys nothing (because anything 
follows from a contradiction), and cannot be obeyed. 
The burden of understanding and complying with rules falls on those 
whom the rules govern; the reciprocal relationship between governors 
and the governed places a corresponding burden on the governor to 
make the rules understood and capable of being complied with. That, 
ultimately, is why clear communication and reasonableness are moral 
virtues of the lawmaker. 
36 A manager may also issue orders in the form of general directives-rules-but remains 
at liberty to depart from the directives when circumstances require. In the terminology of 
Rawls's "Two Concepts of Rules," the manager adopts a "summary conception" of rules, 
whereas the lawmaker adopts a "practice conception." John Rawls, "Two Concepts of 
Rules," in Rawls, Collected Papers, ed. Samuel Freeman (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1999), 34-39. 
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V. "'DISCOVERY' IN THE MORAL REALM" 
Why does Fuller call his view "natural law"? Fuller energetically 
rejects the traditional idea that natural law represents "higher law" 
(RFCL 379, ML 96, RN 84), and indeed he suspects that the appeal to 
higher law is an unfortunate residue from positivism (PFL 656, 659-60). 
Strikingly, he attributes no authority to laws as such: like a good legal 
realist, he argues that judges should treat statutes and precedents sim-
ply as "one [more] of the realities the judge must respect in making his 
decisions" (RFCL 380)-in other words, as constraints within which 
judicial problem-solving must maneuver, not as authorities to which 
judges must defer. If Fuller had never employed the term "natural 
law" in connection with his views, we might be hard-pressed to guess 
that his is a natural law jurisprudence. 
Fuller's pronouncements about natural law do not help much. "I dis-
cern ... one central aim common to all the schools of natural law, that of 
discovering those principles of social order which will enable men to 
attain a satisfactory life in common. It is an acceptance of the possibility 
of 'discovery' in the moral realm that seems to me to distinguish all the 
theories of natural law from opposing views" (RN 84). Talk of the pos-
sibility of discovery in the moral realm makes it sound as if Fuller equates 
natural law theory with moral realism. But moral realism, the thesis that 
moral judgments are objective and referential, is not distinctive to natural 
law. Positivists, who believe that law can and should be open to moral 
criticism, can accept the realist thesis without difficulty. Indeed, many of 
the positivists were utilitarians, and utilitarians hold that judgments of 
right and wrong-claims about which actions are utility-maximizing and 
which are not-are objective and referential. 
Elsewhere, Fuller cautions that "for many the term 'natural law' still 
has about it a rich, deep odor of the witches' cauldron" (RFCL 379). But 
all it really signifies, he says, is 
that there are external criteria, found in the conditions required for 
successful group living, that furnish some standard against which 
the rightness of ... decisions should be measured .... Certainly it 
would never occur to him [the natural lawyer] to describe the natural 
law he sought to discover, and felt bound to respect, as a "brooding 
omnipresence in the skies." Rather for him it would be a hard and 
earthy reality that challenged his best intellectual efforts to capture it. 
The emotional attitude ... would not be that of one doing obeisance 
before an altar, but more like that of a cook trying to find the secret 
of a flaky pie crust .... (RFCL 379) 
Once again, there is nothing here that a utilitarian positivist could not 
enthusiastically embrace. Like Fuller, the utilitarian positivist is an ethical 
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naturalist, who believes that deciding what the law ought to be is hard 
intellectual work, with external standards of success determined in large 
part by empirical facts about nature and human nature. 
I believe, however, that once we think of Fuller's theory as the profes-
sional ethics of lawmaking, we find a coherent answer to the question of 
what makes it a natural law theory: it derives moral requirements of the 
lawmaker's job from features unique to the lawmaking enterprise. Unlike 
other natural law theories, however, the morality implicit in Fuller's con-
cept of law is the morality of lawmaking, not of the law made. 
Fuller complains that positivists neglect the distinctive role-morality of 
lawmaking: "If the lawgiver enacts what Hart calls 'iniquitous' laws, he 
sins of course against general morality, but there is no special morality 
applicable to his job itself" (ML 193). This description is plainly true of 
utilitarianism, which regards a job as nothing more than a causal path 
connecting an agent's input to output in the form of utility, the way that 
a transmission connects an auto's engine to its wheels. The utilitarian 
would regard the role-morality of a job as nothing more than an appli-
cation or instantiation of the principle of utility. For Fuller, however, it is 
a fallacy "to assume that moral precepts retain the same meaning regard-
less of the social context into which they are projected" (ML 207); he 
accuses both utilitarians and Kantians of this fallacy (PSO 201). What 
both overlook, Fuller argues, is that when you take on a job, intending to 
pursue it in a way that respects general morality, you discover that the job 
creates moral expectations of its own (PSO 200-201). Fuller's arguments 
about the morality of law are meant to show that lawmaking has its own 
distinctive virtues (conformity to the eight canons) and its own distinctive 
moral outlook (respect for the self-determining agency of the governed), 
both of which follow from the nature of the lawmaking enterprise and not 
directly from general morality. 
This is what Fuller has in mind when he writes about discovery in the 
moral realm. He is not tendering a general commitment to moral realism, 
but rather making the more specific claim that institutions, particularly 
legal institutions, although they are entirely human creations, have moral 
properties of their own-properties that their designers may never have 
intended or even thought about, and that are connected only indirectly to 
general morality. Identifying the morality of institutions, the virtues and 
vices of participating in them, is a matter of discovery, not invention -a 
matter of reason rather than fiat. 
I think Fuller is right. We can observe these phenomena in the evolution 
of games like baseball. Games are in one sense an entirely positivist 
creation: the rules define the game, and presumably, if the rules permit a 
practice, engaging in it cannot be cheating. One might argue that the 
game would be better if the rules forbade certain practices-in positivist 
terms, that the game as it is isn't the game as it ought to be. But as long 
as the rules do not favor one team over the other, abiding by these rules 
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cannot be criticized on the ground that it is not a fair way to play baseball. 
So goes the positivist argument. 
Yet in actuality, the rules of baseball have been modified repeatedly 
over the years because as the game develops, it becomes clear that some 
behavior permitted by the rules really is cheating. Fielders intentionally 
miss infield pop-ups when there are runners on first and second base, in 
order to get an easy double play; pitchers make the ball curve by spitting 
on it; base runners block batted balls with their bodies to prevent fielders 
from making a play; hitters peek at the catcher to see whether he is setting 
up for an inside or outside pitch; batters with two strikes against them 
intentionally swing and miss at wild pitches so they can run safely to first 
base when the ball flies past the catcher. All of these practices were at one 
time permitted by the rules, and the first three were banned -not because 
the game would be better if they were banned (though this is true), but 
because it became clear that missing infield flies to get the cheap double 
play, throwing the spitter, and interfering with batted balls were forms of 
cheating. These were moral discoveries about baseball-playing, of just the 
kind that Fuller claims to have made about lawmaking. They are part of 
the natural law of an artificial institution. Interestingly, no rule currently 
forbids batters from peeking at the catcher to see where he is setting up. 
However, if the opposing players catch him in the act, the batter will be 
hit by a pitch his next time up, and no one will complain, because even 
the batter knows he deserves it. He has violated the natural law of base-
ball.37 The same goes for the batter with two strikes against him who 
swings at a wild pitch: one writer recalls that when he did this in high 
school, his own teammates shunned him afterward.38 
One might object that these practices are cheating not because they 
violate the "natural law of baseball," but merely because the written rules 
did not do a good enough job of codifying the game as it was supposed 
to be played. But no one knew a priori how baseball was supposed to be 
played; refining the rules was not merely a means to the end of preserv-
ing the original intent of baseball's framers. The discovery that throwing 
the spitball is a form of cheating was simultaneously a discovery about 
the point of the contest between batter and pitcher. The relationship is 
dialectical, not hierarchical. 
37 See Keith Hernandez and Mike Bryan, Pure Baseball: Pitch by Pitch for the Advanced Fan 
(New York: HarperCollins, 1995), 125-27. Interestingly, Hernandez (an all-star first base-
man) states both that the peeker deserves to be hit by a pitch and that peeking is neither 
cheating nor bad sportsmanship. That is because Hernandez believes that nothing, not even 
practices forbidden by the rules, is unfair if the other team or the umpires have a fair 
opportunity to catch and punish the players who engage in it. His is a legal realist view of 
cheating, desert, and self-help, quite distinct from both natural law and positivism. 
38 Ted Cohen, "There Are No Ties at First Base," Yale Review 79, no. 2 (October 1990): 
321-22. "[My teammates] did not care for what I had done .... They regarded me as some-
one who did not really grasp the nature of the game. I thought that in knowing the rules I 
knew the game; they knew the game in some other way." Ibid., 322. I am grateful to David 
Brink for calling Cohen's hilarious essay to my attention. 
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VI. THE PROGRESSIVE POSITIVISTS' CRITIQUE OF NATURAL LAW 
I now turn to criticisms of Fuller's view. In his review of The Morality 
of Law, Hart wonders whether he and Fuller are perhaps "fated never to 
understand each other's work," 39 and on one central issue it seems clearly 
true that Fuller and his positivist critics talk past each other. This is the 
curious issue of which theory provides its adherents with the morally 
superior point of view on the law. The issue is curious, of course, because 
ordinarily we think that theories should be chosen on the basis of whether 
they are correct, not whether they morally improve their adherents. Nev-
ertheless, the argument turns out to be an important one both for Fuller 
and his critics.40 
Let us put it most directly. Fuller repeatedly accuses positivists of being 
statists, "overprimed with power" (PSO 277); theirs, he says, is "the view 
that identifies the lawyer's work with established state power" (PSO 252). 
And repeatedly, progressive positivists like Fred Schauer, Neil MacCor-
mick, and Robin West level the identical accusation of statism against 
natural lawyers.41 (By progressive positivists, I mean positivists who deny 
per se moral authority to the legal status quo and therefore to the state.) 
According to Schauer, "the classical natural law theorist" believes "that 
the very existence of a legal system ... provides ... assurance that the 
legal system has been designed either to incorporate moral criteria or to 
produce morally desirable ends." 42 
This argument between natural lawyers and progressive positivists 
originates in one of the most important passages in Hart's half of the 
debate with Fuller. In "Positivism and the Separation of Law and Mor-
als," Hart accuses natural lawyers of having only "half digested the spir-
itual message of liberalism." 43 Natural lawyers understand that in the 
face of evil enactments by the state, individual conscience prevails over 
the duty to obey. This is the spiritual message of liberalism. But natural 
lawyers have only half-digested it, because it seems that the only way 
39 Hart, "Book Review-The Morality of Law," 1281. 
40 See Philip Soper, "Choosing a Legal Theory on Moral Grounds," in Jules Coleman and 
Ellen Frankel Paul, eds., Philosophy and Law (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 31-48. 
41 See Frederick Schauer, "Positivism Through Thick and Thin," in Brian Bix, ed., Ana-
lyzing Law: New Essays in Legal Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 65-78; Schauer, 
"Fuller's Internal Point of View," 305-12; Frederick Schauer, "Constitutional Positivism," 
Connecticut Law Review 25, no. 3 (Spring 1993): 805-7; Frederick Schauer, "Positivism as 
Pariah," in Robert P. George, ed., The Autonomy of Law: Essays on Legal Positivism (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1996), 31-55; Neil MacCormick, "A Moralistic Case for A-Moralistic 
Law," Valparaiso Law Review 20, no. 1 (Fall 1985): 10-11; Robin West, "Three Positivisms," 
Boston University Law Review 78, no. 3 (June 1998): 791-812; and Robin West, "Natural Law 
Ambiguities," Connecticut Law Review 25, no. 3 (Spring 1993): 831-41. West, it should 
be noted, expounds the progressive positivist view sympathetically without wholly endors-
ing it. 
42 Schauer, "Positivism Through Thick and Thin," 70. 
43 Hart, "Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals," 618; Hart, The Concept of Law, 
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they can license disobedience is by denying that evil enactments are law. 
Apparently, they cannot shake off the idea that law must be obeyed. In 
legal philosopher Donald Regan's felicitous phrase, they still think that 
law has a halo.44 This is the illiberal side of natural law. 
Positivists, according to Hart, are morally more clear-headed. They 
understand that law has no necessary moral content, no halo. They labor 
under one less illusion about where their moral duty lies, and are less 
likely to accede to bad law merely because it is law. Quoting Schauer once 
again, "in insisting that the concept of law does no moral work the [pro-
gressive positivist] is taking the irreducibly moral position that we ought 
not to expect our understanding of law and legal institutions to carry any 
of the moral water when we engage in personal decision-making or in-
stitutional design." 45 
It is very curious to find a natural lawyer like Fuller and progressive 
positivists like Hart and Schauer each accusing the other side of being too 
statist-in effect, each is trying to outflank the other on the left (which of 
course leads battlefield adversaries to revolve in a perpetual circle around 
a point of engagement that neither ever reaches). At least one side in this 
debate is failing to grasp something about the other's position. In this 
case, I think, both are. 
Let us begin with Fuller's accusation that positivists identify law with 
"a one-way projection of authority, originating with government and 
imposing itself upon the citizen" (ML 204). This is only half-true, because 
positivists argue only that legal systems may be one-way projections of 
state authority, not that they must be. Even if the accusation were true, 
though, Fuller wrongly supposes that positivists approve of one-way 
projections of state authority. Hart's argument, of course, is that when the 
law authorizes something evil, a liberal positivist will disapprove and 
disobey. 
Next, look at the progressive positivists' moral critique of natural law. 
Schauer, recall, argues that for classical natural law theorists, the very 
existence of a legal system ensures its morality. Why should that be? 
Schauer offers no argument, but evidently he believes that the classical 
theorists contrapose the natural law maxim "unjust law is not law" into 
the claim that law is just. However, natural lawyers do not actually make 
this mistake in contraposition. The natural law maxim is shorthand for 
"unjust positive law is not genuine law." This is logically equivalent not to 
the claim that (all) law is just, but to the claim that positive law that is also 
genuine law is just.46 The mere existence of positive law leads to no 
conclusion whatever about its justice or injustice. 
44 Donald H. Regan, "Law's Halo," in Coleman and Paul, eds., Philosophy and Law, 15-30. 
45 Schauer, "Positivism Through Thick and Thin," 70. 
46 Among the progressive positivists, West is clear about this. She regards these two ways 
of reading the natural law maxim as an ambiguity in natural law theory, whereas I regard 
them as a positivist misunderstanding of natural law. 
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Let me rephrase all this in a more polemical and less logic-chopping 
manner. Progressive positivists like Hart, MacCormick, and Schauer think 
that the natural law maxim will confuse its adherents and make them too 
impressed with law, too complacent with the status quo, and too likely to 
obey. But of course, "unjust law is not law" is the traditional argument for 
disobedience, not obedience-so who exactly is it who is confused? In its 
most famous contemporary American incarnation, the natural law maxim 
figures prominently in Martin Luther King's "Letter from Birmingham 
City Jail," where King invoked it to explain, in the most stirring terms, 
why he was right to disobey a court order forbidding a 1963 civil rights 
march.47 If the progressive positivists think that the natural law maxim is 
an invitation to complacency and obedience, then they must believe that 
King misunderstood the maxim, because he was neither complacent nor 
obedient. King misunderstood the maxim, apparently, by failing to draw 
the wrong conclusion from it. Isn't it more likely that the progressive 
positivists have misunderstood why natural lawyers like King insist that 
unjust law is not law? 
The positivist moral critique of classical natural law misfires in a slightly 
different way against Fuller's version. The progressive positivists fear 
that anyone who believes in "the morality of law" will illicitly regard 
legal enactments as having already passed a preliminary threshold to-
ward moral acceptability. As we have seen, Fuller thinks just the opposite. 
For Fuller, to call something law entails that it has extra moral demands 
placed on it by virtue of the "morality of law" -the role-morality of 
law-giving. Law's halo, on Fuller's account, provides additional grounds 
for criticizing law, not for obeying it. 
In this respect, at any rate, Hart and Fuller were talking past one 
another. Notice, for example, that when Fuller speaks of "fidelity to law" 
(in PFL) he is generally talking about officials' professional obligation to 
maintain the legal system in good order, not about the citizen's obligation 
to obey the law, which is Hart's topic. Fuller asks how German judges, not 
ordinary Germans, should have responded to the Third Reich, and he 
answers that fidelity to law-which is not the same as obedience to law-
should have led them to resist. 
In a recent essay, Schauer offers a different criticism of Fuller, one 
which presents an interesting twist on the progressive positivist argu-
ment. Schauer focuses on the fact that Fuller's is "insider jurispru-
dence," designed and built to help conscientious legal professionals 
become better lawyers. In the terms I have been urging, it is jurispru-
dence in the service of professional ethics. Schauer accurately remarks 
that "Fuller's perspective flows smoothly from his role as a legal theo-
47 Martin Luther King, Jr., "Letter from Birmingham County Jail," reprinted in King, Why 
We Can't Wait (New York: Mentor, 1964), 76-95. 
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rist explicitly seeing himself located in a law school and speaking to 
actual or would-be lawyers." 48 Insider jurisprudence presupposes that 
the professional project has worth, and is worth the efforts of consci-
entious people to improve it. 
Suppose, however, that one is an outsider, whose question is not "What 
kind of lawyer shall I be?" but "Why should anyone be a lawyer?" 49 An 
outsider need not begin by supposing that the legal system has any worth 
at all, but she does need to understand what the legal system is. For the 
outsider, then, positivism is the superior starting point, for only positiv-
ism facilitates the project of "first ... characterizing the legal system, and 
then ... morally evaluating it." 50 
To illustrate Schauer's point, let our outsider be a visitor newly arrived 
in a foreign country, who asks someone, "What is the legal system like?" 
(Perhaps she is thinking about emigrating to the foreign country and 
going to law school.) And suppose the answer is this: "The judges do 
whatever the regime tells them to, the regime is repressive, the lawyers 
are not allowed to disagree with the judges, the laws are vague and 
change all the time, and the schedule of criminal penalties is a state 
secret." If a Fullerian overhearing the conversation chimes in, "You see, it 
isn't a legal system at all!" the outsider will reply, "Call it whatever you 
like-but the person I just talked with answered the question I am inter-
ested in." The outsider has rightfully asked a positivist question and 
gotten a positivist answer. If the outsider had instead approached the 
Fullerian to ask "What is the legal system like?" and received the answer, 
"There is no legal system here," this answer would be misleadingly coy, 
and in no way more truthful. 
Nor is "There is no legal system here" a caricature of Fuller's way of 
talking. In his reply to Hart, Fuller quotes a Hitler-era statute against 
slandering the Nazi Party, deems it a "legislative monstrosity," and then 
embraces the view of postwar German courts that "saw fit to declare this 
thing not a law" (PFL 654, 655). Schauer's point, I take it, is that there is 
a straightforward "positivist" sense, glossed over by Fuller, in which the 
statute is a law (and not, say, a poem). Otherwise, how could Fuller call 
it a "statute" and declare it a legislative monstrosity? 
Embedded in Schauer's argument we find a claim that Fuller denies: 
that the insider's concept of law, which Schauer agrees is and should be 
a moralized one, is unnecessary to describe a society's legal institutions-a 
"positivist" description is available. The examples just presented make 
48 Schauer, "Fuller's Internal Point of View," 305. 
49 Ibid., 308. 
50 Ibid., 309-10. In "Positivism Through Thick and Thin," Schauer remarks that he finds 
it no coincidence that among three of the austerest positivists-himself, Jules Coleman, and 
David Lyons-"two do not possess law degrees and the third no longer teaches primarily 
in a law school." Schauer, "Positivism Through Thick and Thin," 70 n. 1. 
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this seem plausible, but Fuller would not be without a response. It would 
go, I take it, as follows.51 
'Lawmaking' is a purposive concept, and the purpose of lawmaking is 
to subject human conduct to the governance of rules (ML 146). Like all 
purposive concepts, it contains implicit criteria of success and failure. As 
we have seen, lawmaking creates a moral relationship between governors 
and the governed, and successfully carrying out the terms of that rela-
tionship is part of what succeeding at lawmaking means. It follows that 
if our outsider can recognize what her informant has described as a legal 
system at all, she can, and indeed must, recognize it as a deviant legal 
system. Its servile judges, repressive rulers, gagged lawyers, vague and 
inconstant rules, and secret punishments represent a gross deviation from 
the aspirations inherent in the lawmaking enterprise. 
Could the positivist resist this conclusion by declining to describe legal 
systems purposively? This is easier said than done. When the outsider 
asks "What is the legal system like?" she must have in mind some concept 
of what a legal system is, for not just anything can count as a legal system. 
If the informant answers the outsider's question by saying, "People wan-
der through the countryside gathering grapefruit, which they sell in the 
marketplace," the outsider would not think, "My, what an unusual legal 
system." She would instead draw the Davidsonian conclusion that she 
and her interlocutor are not understanding each other's words properly.52 
And she would draw that conclusion because what the informant has 
described does not do, badly or otherwise, what legal systems do-thus, 
her informant cannot be talking about a legal system. 
An outsider's description of an alien legal system is implicitly a com-
parison of that system with her, and our, concept of what a legal system 
is and is for. Such a concept is an insider's purposive concept. The idea 
that one can dispense with the internal perspective on legal systems turns 
out to be untrue, because we need the internal perspective-our under-
standing of the point of a legal system-in order to recognize a legal 
system when we encounter one. Even the outsider's viewpoint on a legal 
system presupposes the priority of the purposive point of view. 
It may be thought, however, that all these arguments overlook the 
progressive positivists' most basic concern, which is simply that insider 
jurisprudence lacks critical bite. For a critique of human sacrifice you do 
not turn to the priest-not even the ethical priest who treats the victim 
51 In the arguments that follow, I am drawing freely from (and modifying in part) LQI and 
RN. Interestingly, Ernest Nagel offered an argument very similar to Schauer's thirty-five 
years earlier. Ernest Nagel, "On the Fusion of Fact and Value: A Reply to Professor Fuller," 
Natural Law Forum 3, no. 1 (1958): 79. 
52 Donald Davidson has for many years defended the so-called "principle of charity" 
in linguistics, a rule of thumb which states that if your translation of a foreigner's utter-
ances implies that the foreigner has crazy beliefs, the fault lies in your translation. Donald 
Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 
xvii, 196-97. 
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with impeccable concern and respect, at least until the altar is ready. 
Lawyers, it might be feared, are like these priests. They have too much 
invested in their system to seriously contemplate major revisions. Fur-
thermore, lawyers' knowledge is system-specific local knowledge, and 
the sheer desire for epistemic comfort, the fear of the unknown, may well 
block lawyers from grasping that entire continents of their legal system 
are unjust or dysfunctional. 
This may be so, but precisely the same things might be said of non-
lawyers. Unjust laws are seldom only legal injustices. They typically rep-
resent the moral views of dominant or once-dominant groups in the 
larger society-what King, in his Birmingham letter, accurately described 
as the "numerical or power majority group." Nonlawyers who belong to 
a system's numerical or power majority group are beneficiaries of the 
system just as lawyers are, and they are no less likely to confront episte-
mic vertigo at the prospect of abandoning the familiar evils and the moral 
beliefs that ratify them. 
Perhaps, then, the authentic outsider's standpoint is that of the victims 
of unjust laws. However, victims are usually cut off from access to infor-
mation about how their oppressive legal system operates, and in many 
cases are also denied the basic goods of education. Historically, the great 
social and legal critics have been insiders or semi-insiders whose lively 
sense of critical morality allows them to pass beyond their own self-
interest and identify with the victims of bad law. I see no reason to 
suppose that legal insiders will have a weaker sense of critical morality 
than outsiders. Are legal professionals like Thurgood Marshall or Ca-
tharine MacKinnon really at a disadvantage in diagnosing bad law? Worse 
at it than Malcolm X or Andrea Dworkin? There is no reason to suppose 
anything of the kind. 
VIL II A BRUTAL INDIFFERENCE TO JUSTICE AND HUMAN WELFARE" 
And yet there does seem to be something amiss in Fuller's theory, 
something too quick and easy in the way it concludes that an immoral 
lawmaker is not just letting down his subjects, but is also betraying the 
very idea of law. As we have seen, Fuller argues that the enterprise of 
subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules presupposes a moral 
relationship between governors and the governed -a moral relationship 
aimed at promoting the self-determining agency of the governed. From 
this relationship, it follows that the eight canons are moral excellences, 
not just rules of efficacy. All this seems like an awful lot to derive from the 
bare concept of people governing other people through rules. Fuller has 
pulled a very large rabbit out of a very small hat. His theory seems too 
good to be true. 
I wish to suggest that it is too good to be true. Like Schauer, I trace 
Fuller's overoptimism about the law to his insider perspective. This is 
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not, however, because of the generalized worry about insiders that I have 
just discussed. The problem is not with insider jurisprudence as such, but 
with the fact that Fuller's insiders are lawyers. Quite simply, the lawyer's 
role is more problematic than Fuller admits. 
At one point, Fuller throws out a challenge to his doubters, rhetorically 
asking whether "history does in fact afford significant examples of re-
gimes that have combined a faithful adherence to the internal morality of 
law with a brutal indifference to justice and human welfare" (ML 154). He 
plainly believes that the answer is "no," but I begin my argument by 
suggesting that the answer is "yes" in almost every regime that has ever 
existed. This is because almost every regime that has ever existed has 
legislated expressly to deny the self-determining agency of women, and 
has thereby denied what Fuller claims is the substantive morality immi-
nent in law. Until the most recent times in a bare handful of nations, 
women have enjoyed few or no political rights, have been classified as 
property or quasi property, and have been subjected by law to the tute-
lage of their husbands and fathers. One might offer analogous examples 
drawn from the histories of slavery or legally explicit ethnic subjugation. 
(Would Fuller deny that the American law of slavery adhered rather well 
to the internal morality of law? On what grounds?) However, I think that 
the for-all-practical-purposes-universal legal subjugation of women offers 
the most striking example of what goes wrong in Fuller's theory.53 
The important point, it seems to me, is this. Fuller maintains that 
any legal regime that abides by the eight canons will respect the self-
determining agency of those to whom its rules are addressed; so far as 
it goes, his argument is profound and correct. But it does not go as far 
as Fuller hoped, because he overlooks an important qualification: those 
whose self-determining agency law aims to further need not include 
the entire population subject to the law, because the rules may really 
be addressed only to a numerical or power majority (to borrow King's 
words once again). That is, it may well be that the legal edifice of 
patriarchy aims to enhance the self-determining agency of men. But it 
does so at the expense of women, who are subject to the tyranny (or, at 
best, the managerial direction) of their husbands and fathers. Justice for 
the guys coexists with injustice for women. 
The crucial condition under which this form of mixed justice and in-
justice can exist is that the dominant group is able to exert direct control 
over the subordinate group by virtue of living side-by-side with them. To 
take a straightforward illustration, legal regulation of slaveholders, es-
53 One might object that regimes of slavery or ethnic/gender subordination violate the 
canon of generality, and hence they are not genuine rule-of-law regimes. However, gener-
ality does not mean that identical laws apply to everyone. It means only that when a rule 
classifies people, it applies equally to everyone in the specified class. For example, a rule 
forbidding married women from forming binding contracts without their husbands' per-
mission would satisfy the generality requirement if it applied to all married women. 
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tablishing a framework of general rules that advances and respects their 
self-determining agency, turns out to be wholly consistent with tyrannical 
or managerial regulation of slaves. In just the same way, patriarchal legal 
orders enhance the self-determining agency of men in part by enhancing 
their license to exert unfettered authority over women. The problem, it 
seems, is that even though both men and women fall under the law's 
jurisdiction, the law excludes women from the community whose free-
dom it aims to enhance. 
I can find no evidence that Fuller ever considered the catastrophic 
asymmetry between whom the law binds and whom the law helps, nor 
the implications for his jurisprudence of the law's exclusion of women 
from the community of freedom. He was certainly aware, though, of the 
"basic question": "Who is embraced in the moral community?" -that is, 
"Who shall count as a member of the in-group?" (ML 181). He was, after 
all, writing during the heyday of the civil rights movement. 
Within a given political society there are men commonly described as 
being of different races. These men have lived together for many 
years .... They have together produced a common culture. Is there no 
moral principle that can imperatively condemn drawing a line be-
tween them, and denying to one group access to the essentials on 
which a satisfactory and dignified life can be built? (ML 183) 
Fuller recognizes that he needs an affirmative answer to this question, but 
the one he provides is unsatisfying, except perhaps as rhetoric. He cites 
the parable of the Good Samaritan and a famous Talmudic aphorism to 
argue "that we should aspire to enlarge that community [the moral com-
munity] at every opportunity" (ML 183), because the morality of aspira-
tion" cannot refuse the human quality to human beings without repudiating 
itself" (ML 183). Confusingly, Fuller asserts that these are propositions 
from the morality of aspiration that are fully as imperative as duties. So 
far as I can tell, Fuller provides no reason for supposing that the scrip-
tures he cites truly set out the morality of aspiration, or for thinking that 
cosmopolitan aspirations have the force of duties, or for assuming that 
cosmopolitanism belongs to the morality of law as Fuller understands 
it-namely, the professional ethics of lawgivers and law-appliers. Fuller 
seems to have forgotten his own distinction between criticizing bad laws 
on general moral grounds, which he disfavors, and criticizing them as 
violations of the distinctive role-morality of the legislator, a practice of 
which he approves. 
He cannot, for example, really mean that any lawmaker who enacts 
sexist or racist legislation has violated the role-morality of the legislator's 
craft. The legislative role-morality surely does not contain an equal pro-
tection clause built in a priori. If anything, the argument seems more 
plausible going the other way: perhaps legislators have a role-obligation 
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to enact laws that they find morally objectionable if those laws truly 
codify the dominant morality of the society.54 Tennyson's ultracosmopol-
itan Ulysses ("I am a part of all that I have met"), having returned from 
his wanderings to govern the cultural backwater of Ithaca, understands 
that only "slow prudence" will be able "to make mild a rugged people, 
and thro' soft degrees subdue them to the useful and the good." In the 
meantime, "I mete and dole unequal laws unto a savage race." 55 Unequal 
laws, apparently, are all that a savage race can handle, and a conscientious 
lawmaker will not jump the gun. This argument may be wrong: there is 
a genuine question about whether a professional's role-morality can over-
ride the demands of universal morality.56 But even if the answer is no, the 
reason that it is no is because of the priority of the universal over the 
particular, not because the demands of universal morality are built into 
the structure of role-morality a priori, for legislators or anyone else. 
Fuller is indulging in wishful thinking. He wishes that lawmaking were 
inherently cosmopolitan, because his argument requires a cosmopolitan 
solution to the problem of defining the moral community. He confronts a 
familiar problem in legal ethics. His lawmakers, we have seen, are like 
transactional lawyers, aiming to facilitate their clients' interactions with a 
well-crafted structure of rules. But transactional lawyers have clients, and 
there are limits to how far lawyers can take into account the interests of 
nonclients. Even when transactions require reciprocity between clients 
and other parties, each lawyer's primary loyalty runs to her own client-
and none of the lawyers may pay attention to the interests of parties who 
are not part of the transaction at all, regardless of whether the transaction 
affects those parties' vital interests. The Fullerian legislator is like a trans-
actional lawyer whose "client" is the numerical or power majority in the 
community; and, as in the case of the lawyer, there is a tension between 
legislating on behalf of the client's interest and legislating on behalf of 
everyone's interest. 
In his many writings on the adversarial ethics of the legal profession, 
Fuller made it clear that he was aware of the problem that advancing 
client interests may not be in the public interest; but he never found a 
successful solution to it.57 That is because no successful solution can be 
found. Proving that the pursuit of special interests is identical to the 
54 That, at any rate, was Oliver Wendell Holmes's conclusion. "[T]he proximate test of 
good government is that the dominant power has its way," he wrote, and "legislation ... 
should modify itself in accordance with the will of the de facto supreme power in the 
community." The first quotation comes from "Montesquieu," in Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
Collected Legal Papers (New York: Peter Smith, 1952), 258; the second, from Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, "The Gas-Stokers' Strike," Harvard Law Review 44, no. 5 (March 1931): 796. 
55 Alfred, Lord Tennyson, "Ulysses," in Robert Penn Warren and Albert Erskine, eds., Six 
Centuries of Great Poetry (New York: Dell, 1955), pp. 411-12, 11.3-4, 18, 36-38. 
56 I have offered an extended treatment of this question in my Lawyers and Justice: An 
Ethical Study (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), chaps. 6 and 7. 
57 I argue this in detail in "Rediscovering Fuller's Legal Ethics," 819-29. 
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pursuit of general interests is like squaring the circle. It is a problem that 
political philosophers have always wrestled with-Kant argued that the 
interests of male property-holders are suitably universal, Hegel entered 
the same claim for bureaucrats, Marx for the proletariat, Gyorgy Lukacs 
for the Communist Party, and innumerable patriarchs for the menfolk. 
History has been unusually generous in providing counterexamples to 
their theories. Civic republican constitutional theorists have in recent 
years made the claim of universality on behalf of judges.58 But Fuller is 
perhaps the only philosopher to do so on behalf of lawyers.59 That is one 
of his great strengths; no one, it seems to me, has thought more deeply or 
perceptively about the services of lawyers in the liberalization of societies. 
But (let's face it) lawyers aren't that good. 
Law and Philosophy, Georgetown University Law Center 
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